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Abstract 
Descriptive realism holds that T is true, while normative realism holds that T is warranted. 
Descriptive pessimism holds that T is false, while normative pessimism holds that T is 
unwarranted. We should distinguish between descriptive and normative realism because some 
arguments against scientific realism require that scientific realism be interpreted as 
descriptive realism, and because scientific realists can retreat from descriptive to normative 
realism when descriptive realism is under attack. We should also distinguish between 
descriptive and normative pessimism because some arguments against scientific pessimism 
require that it be interpreted as descriptive pessimism, and because scientific pessimists can 
retreat from descriptive to normative pessimism when descriptive pessimism is under attack.  
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1. Introduction 
Scientific realism and pessimism are opposing views about T, one of our best current 
theories. The literature presents descriptive and normative versions of scientific realism, 
which I call descriptive realism and normative realism, respectively. Descriptive realism 
holds that T is true,1 while normative realism holds that T is warranted. There are also 
descriptive and normative versions of scientific pessimism, which I call descriptive 
pessimism and normative pessimism, respectively. Descriptive pessimism holds that T is 
false, while normative pessimism holds that T is unwarranted. It is vitally important to 
distinguish between descriptive and normative realism, and between descriptive and 
normative pessimism.  
I use the terms ‘descriptive pessimism’ and ‘normative pessimism’ instead of the terms 
‘descriptive antirealism’ and ‘normative antirealism’ for the following two reasons. First, 
descriptive pessimism and normative pessimism originate from the pessimistic induction as 
will become clear in Section 3. Second, ‘antirealism’ refers to any position that opposes 
realism. Thus, ‘antirealism’ refers not only to the positions that T is false and unwarranted, 
but also to the positions that T is empirically adequate, that it is warranted that T is 
empirically adequate, and so forth. So ‘antirealism’ is a more inclusive term than 
‘pessimism.’ 
I undertake the following tasks in this paper. In Section 2, I point out that both 
descriptive and normative realism can be found in the no-miracles argument (Putnam, 1975). 
I argue that they have different capacities, that some objections to scientific realism depend 
upon scientific realism being descriptive realism, and that the downfall of descriptive realism 
does not necessarily mean the downfall of normative realism. In Section 3, I argue that there 
                                           
1 This paper drops ‘typically’ and ‘approximately’ for the sake of brevity. 
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are descriptive and normative versions of the pessimistic induction (PI), and hence that there 
are also descriptive and normative pessimism. I show that descriptive pessimism is more 
vulnerable to attack from scientific realists than normative pessimism is. I argue that the 
consideration of the PI can lead to the distinction between descriptive and normative realism, 
and between descriptive and normative empiricism. In Section 4, I explicate how Bas van 
Fraassen’s (1980) definitions of scientific realism and constructive empiricism relate to the 
aforementioned four positions. 
Anjan Chakravartty (2017) and Darrell Rowbottom (2017) present comprehensive 
overviews of dialectical terrains concerning scientific realism. Such papers are useful to both 
new participants and veterans in the scientific realism debate. This paper, however, arises 
from the observation that these two survey articles do not distinguish between descriptive and 
normative realism, nor between descriptive and normative pessimism. The literature has 
neglected these distinctions, despite the fact that the scientific realism debate has been 
vigorous and voluminous for the past several decades. 
 
2. The No-Miracles Argument 
The no-miracles argument (NMA) is the most famous consideration for scientific realism 
(Sankey, 2017: 201). This section aims to show that both descriptive and normative realism 
inhere in the NMA, and that some arguments regarding scientific realism only make sense 
under the interpretation that it is descriptive realism, and not under the interpretation that it is 
normative realism.  
There are successful theories in science, such as general relativity, evolutionary theory, 
and special relativity. Why are they successful? An answer can be found in Hilary Putnam’s 
NMA: 
 
The positive argument for realism is that it is the only philosophy that doesn’t make the success 
of science a miracle. That terms in mature scientific theories typically refer (this formulation is 
due to Richard Boyd), that the theories accepted in a mature science are typically approximately 
true, that the same term can refer to the same thing even when it occurs in different theories – 
these statements are viewed by the scientific realist not as necessary truths but as part of the 
only scientific explanation of the success of science, and hence as part of any adequate scientific 
description of science and its relations to its objects. (Putnam, 1975: 73)  
 
Descriptive realism is explicit in the last sentence of this passage. According to Putnam, 
scientific realism describes science. What about normative realism? It is implicit in the first 
sentence of the passage above. Putnam’s assertion that the successful performance of theories 
would be a miracle, if they were false, implies that it is unreasonable to believe that they are 
false, and that their successful performance would not be a miracle, if they were true, implies 
that it is reasonable to believe that they are true. To say that it is reasonable to believe that 
they are true is to be committed to normative realism. In sum, both descriptive realism and 
normative realism can be found in the NMA. 
How do descriptive and normative realism differ? A fundamental difference is that 
descriptive realism is capable of being true or false, whereas normative realism is not. 
Descriptive realism would be true if T is as descriptive realism holds it to be, i.e., if T is true, 
and false if T is not as descriptive realism holds it to be, i.e., if T is false. T is directly 
rendered true or false by the world. Consequently, descriptive realism is indirectly rendered 
true or false by the world. By contrast, normative realism, because it is a normative thesis, is 
not capable of being true or false. Even if T happens to be true, it is an open question whether 
it is warranted or not, as will become clear in the next section.  
A derivative difference between descriptive and normative realism is that the former 
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can explain the success of T, but the latter cannot. It makes sense to say, for example, that the 
meta-hypothesis that T is true explains why T makes true predictions, i.e., it makes sense to 
say that T makes true prediction because it is true. By contrast, it is conceptually problematic 
to say that the meta-hypothesis that T is warranted explains why it makes true predictions, 
i.e., it is conceptually problematic to say that T makes true predictions because it is 
warranted. We should rather say that T is warranted, if at all, because it makes true 
predictions. Since descriptive realism and normative realism have different capacities, we 
should distinguish between them. 
The importance of distinguishing between descriptive and normative realism looms 
once we consider three famous objections to the NMA. The first famous objection is that the 
NMA begs the question against the critics of abduction. The critics disbelieve that abduction 
is a reliable rule of inference. The NMA, however, relies on abduction, so it would not 
convince them. For this reason, Larry Laudan and Arthur Fine characterize the NMA, 
respectively, as “a monumental case of begging the question” (Laudan, 1981: 45) and as “a 
paradigm case of begging the question” (Fine, 1991: 82). 
These two philosophers start with the assumption that scientific realism is descriptive 
realism, which explains the success of T, and then contend that descriptive realism rests upon 
a circular argument. To say that descriptive realism is unwarranted means that T is 
unwarranted, which is exactly what normative pessimism affirms. Thus, Laudan and Fine set 
out to criticize descriptive realism and end up accepting normative pessimism. 
The second famous objection is that the NMA is undermined by alternative accounts of 
the success of T. 2  Critics of the NMA might propose, for example, that the empirical 
adequacy of T accounts for its success (Ladyman, 1999: 186), or that the behavior of 
observables accounts for the success of T (Mizrahi, 2012: 137; Lyons, 2018: 147). These 
alternative explanations do not appeal to a miracle to explain the success of T. Thus, their 
existence undermines Putnam’s contention that scientific realism “is the only philosophy that 
doesn’t make the success of science a miracle” (Putnam, 1975: 73).  
The critics of the NMA start with the assumption that scientific realism is descriptive 
realism, which explains the success of T, and then claim that descriptive realism is 
unwarranted due to the existence of the alternative hypotheses that do not appeal to the truth 
of T. To say that descriptive realism is unwarranted is to say that T is unwarranted, which is 
exactly what normative pessimism affirms. Thus, they set out to criticize descriptive realism 
and end up accepting normative pessimism.  
The third famous objection is that historical counterexamples undercut scientific 
realism (Laudan, 1981: 47–48). The idea is that some false theories were successful, and 
these all run counter to the thesis that every successful theory is true. Lyons formulates this 
objection as follows: 
 
1. If (a) that realist meta-hypothesis were true, then (b) we would have no successful theories 
that cannot be approximately true. (If we did, each would be a “miracle,” which no one of 
us accepts.) 
2. However, (no-b) we do have successful theories that cannot be approximately true: the list 
(of “miracles”). 
3. Therefore, (no-a) the realist meta-hypothesis is false. (And the no-miracles argument put 
forward to justify that meta-hypothesis is unacceptable.) (Lyons 2016: 566) 
 
                                           
2 See Park (2014) for a critical discussion of nine antirealist accounts. 
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This argument is a modus tollens. It has the same form as the following argument: If all 
apples were red, there would be no white apples, but there are some white apples; thus, it is 
false that all apples are red. In other words, white apples exist, and they are all 
counterexamples to the general statement that all apples are red. It follows that we should be 
agnostic about whether the next apples will be red. Laudan and Lyons’s argument is similarly 
intended to establish that we should be agnostic that current theories are true. Their argument 
is not intended to establish that current theories are false. For this reason, Park (2019a: 
Section 4.3) calls it the agnostic deduction. 
As far as I can tell, Laudan and Lyons start with the assumption that scientific realism 
is descriptive realism, and then contend that the historical counterexamples show that 
descriptive realism is false, i.e., that it is false that every successful theory is true. Thus, 
current theories might be true or might be false, and we do not know whether they are true or 
false, which means that they are unwarranted, and that is exactly what normative pessimism 
affirms. Therefore, we can say that Laudan and Lyons set out to criticize descriptive realism 
and end up accepting normative pessimism.  
Let me now turn to writers who take scientific realism to be normative realism. 
Timothy Lyons defines scientific realism as the view that “we can justifiably believe the 
hypothesis that successful theories are approximately true” (Lyons, 2005: 171). Lyons (2016: 
564, 2017: 1, 2018: 148) gives similar formulations of scientific realism. K. Brad Wray 
interprets Philip Kitcher’s (2001) scientific realism as claiming that “there is a strong 
connection between success and truth that warrants our believing that our successful theories 
are true” (Wray, 2013: 1722). Thomas Nickles embraces non-realism, according to which we 
do not “have sufficient evidence and argument to conclude with confidence that even our 
most mature theories are true, or very nearly, that at best minor tweaking will be necessary” 
(2017: 151). Thus, Nickles would define scientific realism as the thesis that we have enough 
evidence to conclude so. These three philosophers’ formulations of scientific realism all come 
down to the suggestion that T is warranted, which is exactly what normative realism asserts. 
Thus, they would define scientific pessimism as the view that T is unwarranted, which is 
exactly what normative pessimism asserts. 
In line with Lyons, Wray, and Nickles are other philosophers, such as David Papineau 
(1996), Alan Musgrave (2017, 2018), and van Fraassen (2017). Papineau takes constructive 
empiricism to be the thesis that “we ought never to believe in the truth of any theory which 
goes beyond the observable phenomena” (1996: 8). Given that Papineau takes constructive 
empiricism to be a normative thesis, he would also take scientific realism to be the 
corresponding normative thesis that the belief of T is reasonable. According to Musgrave, 
scientific realism asserts that “it is reasonable to believe that H is true” (Musgrave, 2017: 
80). Van Fraassen replies that “such a belief is reasonable enough, but supererogatory” 
(2017: 102). Note that both Musgrave and van Fraassen contend that the belief of H is 
reasonable. In sum, all these three philosophers would take scientific realism to be normative 
realism. 
It is conceptually problematic to suggest that T is successful because the belief of T is 
reasonable. As noted above, Lyons, Wray, Nickles, Papineau, Musgrave, and van Fraassen, 
take scientific realism to be normative realism. As a result, they would not say that scientific 
realism explains the success of T. If they happen to say so, however, we should interpret them 
as saying that descriptive realism explains the success of T. 
Earlier in this section, I introduced the three famous objections to descriptive realism. 
Recall that by attacking descriptive realism, the objectors all end up embracing normative 
pessimism. The demise of descriptive realism, however, does not necessarily lead to 
normative pessimism, given that there are alternative positions, viz., normative realism and 
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descriptive pessimism. An interesting question is whether the three objections count as 
convincing reasons for rejecting normative realism. Should we reject normative realism 
because the no-miracles argument is circular, because there are alternative accounts of the 
success of T, or because some successful theories were false in the history of science? This 
question can trigger interesting debates between normative realists and their opponents. 
Unfortunately, it would take us too far afield to stake out a position in this intriguing territory.  
This paper only offers an outline of how debates between normative realists and their 
opponents could unfold. Regarding the problem of circularity, normative realists could reply 
that new positive arguments for descriptive realism are introduced into the literature (Park, 
2018a: Section 3, 2018b: 57, 2018c, Section 3; 2019b: Section 3; 2019c: Section 4, 2019d: 
Section 4).  
Such new arguments might amount to a defense of normative realism. Regarding the 
alternative accounts, normative realists could object that the alternative accounts are all 
problematic (Park, 2014). Successful refutations of the alternative accounts would make 
normative realism promising. Regarding the agnostic deduction, they could argue that current 
theories are far more successful than their predecessors, so the falsity of the predecessors 
does not have enough power to make current theories unwarranted. All these contentions 
would be disputed by critics of normative realism. It would require, however, a lengthy 
digression to sketch the dialectic between them. This paper only needs the thesis that the 
demise of descriptive realism does not necessarily lead to the demise of normative realism.  
 
3. The Pessimistic Induction 
The PI, another important argument in the realism debate, is the main consideration against 
scientific realism (Sankey, 2017: 201). This section aims to show that there are descriptive 
and normative versions of the PI, which implies that there are descriptive and normative 
pessimism. We should distinguish between descriptive and normative pessimism because 
normative pessimism is a safer position than descriptive pessimism.  
The descriptive PI holds that just as T1 was false, so T2 is false, where the former is a 
past theory and the latter is a present theory. This version of the PI can be inferred from 
Putnam’s formulation of the PI that “Just as no term used in the science of more than fifty (or 
whatever) years ago referred, so it will turn out that no term used now (except maybe 
observational terms, if there are such) refers” (1978: 25). The descriptive PI can also be 
inferred from Stathis Psillos’s formulation of the PI that “if most past successful scientific 
theories turned out to be false, then, by induction on scientific theories, one must not just 
remain agnostic, but rather claim that current successful scientific theories are likely to be 
false” (1995: 16). Keep in mind that the descriptive PI asserts that T2 is false.  
In contrast, the normative PI holds that just as T1 was unwarranted, so T2 is 
unwarranted. The normative PI is neutral about the truth-value of T2. It says that T2 might be 
true, and that even though T2 is true, we cannot justifiably believe that it is true. No one has 
directly formulated the PI in this manner in the literature. It, however, can be inferred from 
James Ladyman’s formulation that “reflection on the abandonment of theories in the history 
of science motivates the expectation that our best current scientific theories will themselves 
be abandoned, and hence that we ought not to assent to them” (Ladyman, 2014). To say that 
we ought not to assent to present theories is to say that T2 is unwarranted.  
Descriptive and normative pessimism can be found in the descriptive PI and the 
normative PI, respectively. Descriptive pessimism accords with the conclusion of the 
descriptive PI, and normative pessimism with that of the normative PI. In addition, 
descriptive pessimism is the pessimist counterpart of descriptive realism, and normative 
pessimism that of normative realism. 
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Both the descriptive PI and the normative PI should be distinguished from the skeptical 
inference that since T1 was false, T2 is unwarranted. Recall that the descriptive PI holds that 
since T1 was false, T2 is false. The premise and the conclusion are similar to each other in that 
they make definite claims about T1 and T2, respectively. Recall that the normative PI holds 
that since T1 was unwarranted, T2 is unwarranted. The premise and the conclusion are also 
similar to each other in that they make skeptical claims about T1 and T2, respectively. By 
contrast, the premise and the conclusion of the skeptical inference above dissimilar to each 
other in that the former makes a definite claim about T1, but the conclusion makes a skeptical 
claim about T2.  
This skeptical inference exemplifies skepticism about induction (Park, 2019a: Section 
4.2, forthcoming: Section 3). Humean skeptics reason, for example, that since some apples 
have fallen down, we do not know whether the next apple will fall down or not. Note that the 
premise of this skeptical inference makes the definite claim about some apples, but the 
conclusion makes a skeptical claim about the next apple. Humean skeptics reject, while 
scientific pessimists accept, the uniformity principle (Hume, 1888/1978: 89) that the future is 
similar to the past. So if a premise says that T1 was false, Humean skeptics infer that T2 is 
false, and if a premise says that T1 was unwarranted, they infer that T2 is unwarranted. 
Now that we are clear about the distinction between a pessimistic inference and a 
skeptical inference, we are ready to turn to another distinction, the distinction between 
descriptive and normative pessimism. Why should we distinguish between descriptive and 
normative pessimism? Several objections were raised against scientific pessimism in the 
literature, and they require that scientific pessimism be interpreted as descriptive pessimism. 
It is worth examining them in detail one by one. 
Let me begin with a standard criticism against the descriptive PI. It asserts that T1 
explains and predicts more phenomena than T2, so it is a fallacious inference that since T1 
was false, T2 is also false (Musgrave, 1985: 211; Devitt, 2011: 292). Note that this criticism 
targets descriptive pessimism. In the face of this criticism, scientific pessimists tend to retreat 
from descriptive to normative pessimism, i.e., they tend to admit that T2 might be true, but 
maintain that T2 is unwarranted (Park, 2019a: Section 4.2). On their account, the fact that T1 
was false does not make T2 likely to be false, but makes T1 unwarranted. Their move 
indicates that descriptive pessimism is more susceptible to attack than normative pessimism. 
Another standard realist objection to the descriptive PI asserts that the PI commits the 
fallacy called the fallacy of biased statistics (Fahrbach, 2011; Park, 2011; Mizrahi, 2013). 
Pessimists provide a list of past theories to justify the premise of the descriptive PI. The list, 
however, favors distant past theories, e.g., the miasma theory, while failing to include any 
recent past theory, e.g., the kinetic theory. Note that this criticism also targets descriptive 
pessimism. In this face of this objection, scientific pessimists can retreat from descriptive to 
normative pessimism. Their retreat indicates that normative pessimism is a safer position than 
descriptive pessimism. 
Consider also the following confrontation between descriptive realists and pessimists. 
Suppose that there are five successive theories of disease, T1, T2, T3, T4, and T5. T1 and T2 
have been rejected, and T3 is currently accepted. Scientists will need to remove T3 and T4 
before arriving at the true theory, T5. They, however, do not know that they need to remove 
more theories before arriving at the true theory. Under such epistemic circumstances, 
descriptive pessimists would argue that scientists need to remove more theories, including T3, 
before obtaining the true theory, and hence that T3 is false. On their account, the demise of T1 
and T2 does not make it likely that T3 is true. Descriptive realists, however, would retort that 
scientists have already removed enough theories, so T3 is true. On their account, the demise 
of T1 and T2 makes it likely that T3 is true. Note that the more theories that have been 
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discarded, the better it is for descriptive realism, and the fewer theories that have been 
discarded, the better it is for descriptive pessimism. We do not know whether the number of 
discarded theories is large enough to establish descriptive realism, or small enough to 
establish descriptive pessimism. Thus, we do not know whether the history of science favors 
descriptive realism or descriptive pessimism (Park, 2019a: Section 3.1). 
This stalemate between descriptive realists and pessimists might motivate scientific 
pessimists to retreat from the strong position that T3 is false to the weaker position that T3 is 
unwarranted. They admit that T3 might be true, but maintain that scientists are in the 
unfortunate epistemological situation in which they do not know that T3 is true. The gloomy 
history of science constitutes their reason for skepticism about current theories (Park, 2019a: 
Section 4.2). Note that scientific pessimists are willing to give up descriptive pessimism, but 
not normative pessimism, which indicates that normative pessimism less vulnerable to attack 
than descriptive pessimism. Therefore, we should distinguish between them.  
The foregoing stalemate between descriptive realists and pessimists might also 
motivate scientific realists to retreat from the strong position that T3 is true to the weaker 
position that T3 is warranted. They admit that T3 might be false, but maintain that scientists 
are in the fortunate epistemological situation in which the history of science constitutes the 
reason for believing that T3 is true (Park, 2019a: Section 4.2). The history of science is 
favorable to scientific realists because the demise of T1 and T2 makes it likely that T3 is true. 
On their account, scientists have made enough mistakes. Consequently, T3 is warranted. Note 
that scientific realists are willing to give up descriptive realism, but not normative realism, 
which indicates that it is harder to establish descriptive realism than normative realism. 
Therefore, we should distinguish between them.  
Finally, it is also useful to distinguish between descriptive and normative empiricism. 
Descriptive empiricism holds that T is empirically adequate, while normative empiricism 
holds that we are warranted in believing that T is empirically adequate. These two positions 
should be kept distinct, just as descriptive realism and normative realism should be kept 
distinct. There are some objections to descriptive empiricism. For example, a pessimistic 
induction asserts that since T’s precursor was empirically inadequate, T is also empirically 
inadequate (Park, 2018a: 337). In the face of this objection, empiricists might retreat from 
descriptive empiricism to normative empiricism. I, however, leave to interested readers the 
task of fleshing out this line of thinking. 
 
4. Van Fraassen’s Definitions 
How does van Fraassen (1980) define scientific realism and constructive empiricism? How 
do his definitions of these rivaling positions relate to the definitions of descriptive realism 
and pessimism, and to the definitions of normative realism and pessimism?3 
Van Fraassen’s (1980) definitions of the two rivaling positions are not about whether T 
is true or false, whether T is warranted or unwarranted, whether T is empirically adequate or 
inadequate, or whether it is warranted or unwarranted that T is empirically adequate. They are 
rather about what science pursues, and what acceptance of T involves. Specifically, scientific 
realism holds that science “aims to give us, in its theories, a literally true story of what the 
world is like; and acceptance of a scientific theory involves the belief that it is true” (van 
Fraassen, 1980: 8). Constructive empiricism holds that science “aims to give us theories 
which are empirically adequate; and acceptance of a theory involves as belief only that it is 
empirically adequate” (van Fraassen, 1980: 12).  
                                           
3 I thank a reviewer of this journal for this question. 
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What does it mean to accept a theory? Van Fraassen answers that to accept a theory 
means to “confront any future phenomena by means of the conceptual resources of this 
theory” (van Fraassen, 1980: 12). Thus, according to scientific realism, scientists believe that 
T is true when they use it to investigate the world. According to constructive empiricism, by 
contrast, scientists believe that T is empirically adequate when they use it to investigate the 
world. This difference between the two rivaling positions is not well-appreciated in the 
literature. The two rivaling positions make different claims about what scientists believe with 
respect to T when they use it to investigate the world. 
What do the advocates of the two rivaling positions debate over? They debate over 
whether science has the goal to achieve true or empirically adequate theories, and over 
whether scientists believe that T is true or empirically adequate. Consequently, we should not 
expect that they would take positions on the issues of whether T is true or false, whether it is 
warranted or unwarranted, whether it is empirically adequate or inadequate, or whether it is 
warranted or unwarranted that T is empirically adequate.  
Van Fraassen can assert that T is unwarranted, and that T is empirically adequate. 
When he makes such assertions, however, he is not a constructive empiricist. After all, the 
assertions are not entailed by the view that science “aims to give us theories which are 
empirically adequate; and acceptance of a theory involves as belief only that it is empirically 
adequate” (van Fraassen, 1980: 12). It is one thing to say that science seeks empirically 
adequate theories, and that scientists believe that T is empirically adequate when they use it 
to investigate the world. It is quite another to say that T is unwarranted, and that T is 
empirically adequate. An argument is required to make an inference from the former 
contentions to the latter contentions. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Rival philosophers construct various arguments against scientific realism and pessimism in 
the literature. Some objections to scientific realism requires that it be interpreted as 
descriptive realism. These objections may prod scientific realists to retreat from descriptive to 
normative realism. Some objections to scientific pessimism also require that it be interpreted 
as descriptive pessimism. These objections may also prod scientific pessimists to retreat from 
descriptive to normative pessimism. Therefore, we should distinguish between descriptive 
and normative realism, and between descriptive and normative pessimism.  
Which of the foregoing four views about T should the participants in the realism debate 
choose as their framework? The answer depends on what interests them. If they are interested 
in whether T is true, they should choose descriptive realism and pessimism as the framework 
of their debate. If they are interested in whether T is warranted, they should choose normative 
realism and pessimism as the framework of their debates. If they are interested in both, they 
may choose any of the four views. 
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